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Operations

Health

GET /health always answers HTTP 200 with:

{"status":"ok","model_ready":false,"port":8080}

The status code is deliberately unconditional. PULSE serves every non-AI feature without a model, so a readiness probe here should catch a wedged or unbound server, not an AI outage. Read model_ready for the model. It is true only when the engine is running and has confirmed it can serve a request.

Self-healing

An in-process watchdog probes local resources and the inference and voice endpoints, and a remediator reacts to what it finds. SelfHealService/GetStatus shows it working: whether the loop is healthy, the last event, recent events, and how many remediations were tried and failed. healthy is false only when the most recent event is critical and was not remediated. The service only observes. It never triggers remediation itself.

Remediation is automatic by default, from a fixed list of non-destructive actions: restart one of PULSE’s model runners, add bounded capacity to one, open the in-process circuit breaker, roll back the loop’s own most recent change to a runner when that change was made shortly before the fault, or notify. A plan outside that list or below the confidence floor becomes a notification. Nothing deletes data, rolls back a release, or touches a security control. See the self-healing operations agent card.

To turn automatic remediation off, set SELF_HEAL_AUTONOMOUS=false. Plans are still reasoned and recorded, but none is applied.

Logs

Logs are OpenTelemetry-shaped JSON on stdout, with service.name pulse-backend and the version from APP_VERSION. Lines worth watching:

Log lineMeaning
refusing to start: ...A fatal startup condition. The rest of the line names it.
AUTHENTICATION DISABLED — every request will be rejected as UnauthenticatedThe session key is one that authz refuses. Fix PULSE_JWT_SECRET.
PUBLISHCFG ...What each outward channel is allowed to do
grounding: no data/corpus directoryThe product fact files are missing from the image; whitepapers are written without product facts
gRPC reflection ENABLEDReflection is on. It should not be on a deployed instance.
security config validated, or a warning listing problemsThe result of the production gate

The production gate

At startup PULSE checks for insecure configuration:

  • The session key is missing or refused.
  • CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS is unset or contains a wildcard. The backend serves no web bundle and the image no longer sets PULSE_WEB_DIR, so there is no same-origin exemption unless someone sets it by hand (do not).

With PULSE_ENV=production, either problem stops the server with refusing to start in production. Otherwise it is a warning.

A missing or refused session key is the exception: it stops startup on every deployment, whatever PULSE_ENV says, because a server that cannot verify its own sessions has nothing safe to do. What production adds is that the CORS problem stops it too.

TIDE’s k0s overlay sets PULSE_ENV=production on the PulseControlPlane, so a deployment applied from it refuses to start on an insecure configuration. Before applying it to a running instance, confirm the current pod logs security config validated; otherwise the new pod will not start. PULSE_ENV has no other effect: it does not touch billing or plans, and reflection has its own opt-in, PULSE_GRPC_REFLECTION.

Audit pipeline health

Each stage of a one-line audit (Audit a domain) reports to agent health as its own agent, pulse-audit-<stage>. Reports go to TIDE_HEALTH_URL; with it unset there are none. A stage that wedges stops reporting, so it shows as stale in the TIDE console rather than idle.

Every run ends with one log line, audit <run id> (<domain>): <completed | partial | failed> <reasons>. A run is bounded at 45 minutes end to end, and its diagnosis also keeps the PULSE_AUDIT_DEADLINE_SECONDS budget. Time a stage spends waiting for model capacity counts against both.

TLS

Pick one:

SetupHow
TLS at the edge (usual)Nothing to set. The edge terminates TLS and speaks plain HTTP to PULSE.
Direct exposurePULSE_TLS_CERT and PULSE_TLS_KEY. TLS 1.2 minimum, forward-secret AEAD suites only.
Service-plane mutual TLSMESH_MTLS=true, with the mesh CA. Every client needs a mesh certificate. TLS 1.3 only. If the CA is unavailable, the server refuses to start rather than downgrade.

Rate limiting

PULSE_RATE_RPS and PULSE_RATE_BURST cap calls per peer IP. Over-limit calls get ResourceExhausted before any other work. Off by default.

Licence gate

With a licence configured (LICENSE or LICENSE_FILE, verified with LICENSE_PUBLIC_KEY), every non-public call is refused with license expired or invalid when its signature is bad or it has expired. With no licence configured, nothing is gated.

Where the data is, and backups

Everything PULSE keeps is in its appfs root, bucket pulse on the in-cluster object store. Every object there is sealed under PULSE’s own key, derived from TIDE_ENVELOPE_KEK. Back up that bucket with the object store, and keep the KEK: without it the backup cannot be read.

Once encrypted rows in the new envelope format exist, do not roll back to a build from before that format: it cannot read them.