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Network egress controls

Network egress controls

Connectors dial addresses that a person typed into a form, from inside your cluster. A fetcher with no address policy can be turned into a request-forgery tool: pointed at the cloud metadata service, the cluster’s internal services or FACE itself. FACE’s connectors therefore share one hardened dialer, one connector network layer, and one address policy.

Encrypted connectors only

No connector may run without its security settings, and every connection moves off plaintext (owner, 2026-10-27). FACE offers no plaintext connector. One connector security policy is applied in two halves:

  • What holds for every connector, judged from the connection record by the shared store library: insecure_skip_verify is refused, a Postgres or MySQL ssl_mode that allows cleartext is refused (use require, verify-ca or verify-full), a Kafka security_protocol of plaintext or sasl_plaintext is refused (use sasl_ssl), and a cleartext scheme on any address setting, bootstrap server or extra property is refused.
  • What only the connector knows, checked by FACE: what an empty setting or a bare host:port is dialled as, and which credential it signs in with.

Every write (creating a connection, or registering a partner connection manifest) refuses a connection with problems. A stored connection that does not meet the policy is refused on every read, and ListConnections reports the verdict per row in plain words naming the setting to fix. Nothing deletes or rewrites a stored connection.

The shared data sources in the data-systems namespace are registered from deploy/data-systems/connections.toml: Postgres and MySQL with ssl_mode = "require", and Kafka with security_protocol = "sasl_ssl" and SCRAM-SHA-512, trusting the data-systems CA certificate.

The connector address policy

Every outbound connection a connector makes is checked against an egress policy on the address actually dialled, after DNS resolution, on every dial. The policy blocks internal addresses unless an operator explicitly allows a connection to reach them, and it never dials the cloud instance-metadata service. An address that cannot be checked is not dialled.

Allowing a connection to reach internal addresses

Some sources, such as a dock-door reader or a cold-room gateway, are internal by nature. Whether a connection may reach internal addresses is set per connection with the property allow_internal_network (true or false). The decision is stored with the connection, not in an environment variable that would reopen every fetch on the instance.

A refused internal address is reported in words an operator can act on, and the message names the property to set if that address is genuinely the source you mean.

Proxies, redirects and response size

  • No ambient proxy. Connector HTTP clients ignore environment-configured proxies, so the policy always judges the real destination.
  • Redirects stay on the named host. Connector HTTP clients never follow a redirect to a different host: refusing to follow a redirect from … to …. This keeps a tenant’s credential from travelling to a host the connection never named.
  • Bounded timeouts and bodies. Every connector client has a whole-request timeout, and bounded dial and TLS-handshake times. Response bodies are read up to a cap. A body over the cap is refused outright, never reported as a short but complete answer.

The Snowflake and Databricks drivers are handed the same transport through their driver-level transport hooks, so the address policy applies to every address those drivers dial.

Read-only SQL

Every executable SQL path goes through ValidateSQL. That covers the generic SQL service, which also serves the agent loop’s run_sql tool, and the Postgres, MySQL, Snowflake and Databricks connectors. FACE runs read-only queries; statements that could change data are refused. Warehouse connectors pass query parameters as real bound parameters, never by string interpolation.

IPv6-first, IPv4 fully supported

FACE is deployed IPv6-first, while many warehouses and cloud APIs are reachable only over IPv4. Both have to work, so:

  • No code pins an address family. Every dial uses Go’s "tcp" network with no negative FallbackDelay, which gives RFC 8305 Happy Eyeballs behaviour. TestNothingPinsAnAddressFamily fails on any tcp4, tcp6, ip4 or ip6 literal, or on a negative fallback delay.
  • Host:port strings are built and parsed properly. Code uses net.JoinHostPort to build addresses and net.SplitHostPort to parse them, never string concatenation or a colon search. Those break every IPv6 literal. TestNoHandBuiltHostPortInTheBackend parses the backend source and fails on the old patterns. Mutation tests in the same file prove the guard can fail.

Scope of these controls

  • Read-only is not authorisation. ValidateSQL keeps queries to reads. It does not limit which tables a query reads. That limit is the database account’s own permissions, so connect FACE with a least-privilege, read-only database user.
  • Parsing an address is not reaching it. Correct dialling code gives an IPv6-only pod no route to an IPv4-only provider. That route is NAT64 or egress configuration in the deployment.