Skip to content
Networking and address policy

Networking and address policy

IPv6 first, IPv4 fully supported

The Runink platform is IPv6-first, and many data platforms are still reachable only over IPv4. FACE supports both, so no connector pins an address family.

  • TCP dials use Happy Eyeballs (RFC 8305). This covers the HTTP-based connectors, the raw-socket protocols (MQTT, LLRP, Modbus, NMEA, Kafka, RTSP), the Snowflake and Databricks transports, and the PostgreSQL and MySQL drivers. When a name resolves to both IPv6 and IPv4 addresses, FACE races them and uses whichever connects first.
  • gRPC dials (control plane to runner) try addresses in order. They follow RFC 6724 preference, so IPv6 comes first, and fall back to the next address after a connect timeout. They do not race.
  • Reaching IPv4-only services from an IPv6-only network needs NAT64 or an equivalent egress path. That is a deployment concern, not a connector setting. See /docs/operations/.

Writing addresses

  • IPv6 literals need brackets when a port is given: [2001:db8::10]:5432, rtsps://[2001:db8::20]:322/stream, tls://[2001:db8::30]:8883.

  • A bare IPv6 literal without a port is also accepted where a connector applies a default port. FACE detects “has a port” by parsing, not by looking for a colon, so 2001:db8::10 gets the default port appended and bracketed correctly.

  • Default ports:

    ProtocolDefault port
    PostgreSQL5432
    MySQL3306
    MQTT over TLS8883
    LLRP5084
    Modbus-TCP over TLS802
    Kafka9092
    RTSPSstate the port in the URL
    Databricks443
    Runner https:// endpoint443
  • Every address must use an encrypted transport. Cleartext schemes such as http://, tcp://, mqtt:// and rtsp:// are refused. See Security requirements.

  • A URL must not contain credentials (user:pass@). Connectors that parse URLs refuse them and ask you to store the credential on the connection instead.

Connector address policy

Connectors dial addresses that people type into a form. To stop those addresses from reaching the platform’s own internals, outbound connections are checked against an egress policy on the address actually being connected to, after DNS resolution. The policy blocks internal and cloud metadata addresses unless an operator explicitly allows a connection to reach internal addresses; the cloud instance-metadata service is never a data source.

Allowing internal addresses on a connection

A connection whose source genuinely sits inside your network, such as a reader or gateway on the plant network, can be allowed to reach internal addresses with the property allow_internal_network (also accepted: allow_private_network, allow_internal). Use true or false. When an address is refused, the message names the property:

refusing to reach 10.1.2.3: it resolves to a private address, which is inside this deployment's own network rather than on the public internet. If that is genuinely the source you mean, set `allow_internal_network=true` on this connection

Redirects and proxies

  • Redirects. HTTP connectors follow redirects only to the same host. A redirect to another host is refused, so a credential sent to the source you named is never replayed to a different one: refusing to follow a redirect from … to ….
  • Proxies. Connector HTTP clients use no proxy, so the address that is checked is the address that is connected to.

Timeouts and body caps

Every connector bounds its dial, its handshake and its response body. Over-cap responses are refused rather than read short. See each connector page for its figures. When a body exceeds its cap, the message is:

… returned more than N bytes: refusing to report a partially-read answer as a complete one — narrow the request (a shorter collection window, a smaller page size, a single resource) or point the connection at an endpoint that pages